

Security and Authorization

Ramakrishnan & Gehrke, Chapter 21





Overview

- Introduction
- Internet security
- Database access control
- How to hack a database

Intro to DB & Web Service Security

- **Secrecy:**

Users should not be able to **see** things they are not supposed to

- Ex: student can't see other students' grades

- Ex: *TJX*. owns many dept stores in US

- Attacks exploited WEP used at branches
- Over 47 million CC #s stolen dating back to 2002
- *...sue filed by consortium of 300 banks*

- Ex: *CardSystems, Inc*: US credit card payment processing company

- 263,000 CC #s stolen from database via SQL injection (June 2005)
- 43 million CC #s stored unencrypted, compromised
- *...out of business*

Intro to DB & Web Service Security

■ Secrecy:

Users should not be able to **see** things they are not supposed to

- Ex: student can't see other students' grades

■ Ex: *Equifax 2017* [[Siliconbeat](#)]

- Collecting most sensitive citizen data for credit assessment
 - ssn, name, address, birth dates, credit cards, driver's license, history, ...
 - [143m](#) customers affected
- “maybe dozens” of breaches, fix only 6 months after warning
- hacked due to insufficient internal security; patch not installed, but got known
- *BTW*, senior execs [sold 1.8m in stock](#)

*It would be nice to think that perhaps the company was a victim [...] of clever hackers using social engineering [...], but it appears [...] that there is gross **incompetence** involved.*

Intro to DB & Web Service Security

- **Secrecy:**

Users should not be able to see things they are not supposed to

- Ex: student can't see other students' grades

- **Integrity:**

Users should not be able to **modify** things they are not supposed to

- Ex: Only instructors can assign grades

- **Availability:**

Users should be able to see and modify things they are allowed to

- Ex: professor can see and set students' grades (but possibly not modify after release)

Database Access Control

- A **security policy** specifies **who** is authorized to do **what**
 - Authentication: “let me in”
 - Authorization: “let me do this”
- A **security mechanism** allows us to **enforce** a chosen security policy
 - Implemented in DBMS
- Two main mechanisms at DBMS level:
 - Discretionary access control (=security at users' discretion)
 - Mandatory access control (=security enforced)

GRANT Command

GRANT **privileges** ON object TO users [WITH GRANT OPTION]

- The following **privileges** can be specified:
 - **SELECT**: Can read all columns (incl those added later via ALTER TABLE command)
 - **INSERT(col-name)**: Can insert tuples with non-null or non-default values
 - *INSERT means same right with respect to all columns*
 - **DELETE**: Can delete tuples
 - **REFERENCES (col-name)**: Can define foreign keys (other tables) to this column
- If a user has a privilege with the GRANT OPTION, can pass privilege on to other users (with or without passing on the GRANT OPTION)
- Only owner can execute CREATE, ALTER, and DROP

GRANT and REVOKE of Privileges


- GRANT INSERT, SELECT ON Sailors TO Horatio
 - Horatio can query Sailors or insert tuples into it
- GRANT DELETE ON Sailors TO Yuppy WITH GRANT OPTION
 - Yuppy can delete tuples, and also authorize others to do so
- GRANT UPDATE (rating) ON Sailors TO Dustin
 - Dustin can update (only) the rating field of Sailors tuples
- GRANT SELECT ON ActiveSailors TO Guppy, Yuppy
 - This does NOT allow the 'uppies to query Sailors directly!
- **REVOKE** cascades: When a privilege is revoked from X, it is also revoked from all users who got it solely from X

Views and Security

- Views can be used to present necessary information (or a summary), while hiding details in underlying relation(s)
 - Given ActiveSailors, but not Sailors or Reserves, we can find sailors who have a reservation, but not the bid's of boats that have been reserved
- Creator of view has a privilege on the view if (s)he has the privilege on all underlying tables
- Together with GRANT/REVOKE commands, **views are a very powerful access control tool**


Role-Based Authorization

- In SQL-92, privileges were actually assigned to **authorization ids**, which can denote a single user or a group of users
- In SQL:1999 (and in many current systems), privileges are assigned to **roles**
 - Roles can then be granted to users and to other roles
 - Reflects how real organizations work
 - Illustrates how standards often catch up with “de facto” standards embodied in popular systems




How To Hack a Database

- Most common: **SQL injection**
 - Compromise database query



How To Hack a Database (contd.)



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
- What will happen at input of `' ; DROP TABLE Users; --` ? (keyword: DoS)
- *Name 2 independent techniques to prevent!*

Mom 's a Hacker

[found by: Prashant Vaibhav]



How to Expose Yourself



An error occurred during processing. Please call support.
 Lost connection to MySQL server during query
 SQL: select count(*) from LoginsActive where MacAddress='\00:21:70:6E:04:AE'
 and MacAddress!='\ ' and Iface='\br0\ ' and PropertyID='\51225\
 IP:sql.ethostream.com
 DBU:remote
 DB:

OK, that was in 2011.


Command Injection: Another Example

- Target: Web browser login page, credentials input
- Enter this as user name:
`<script>alert(1)</script>`
- What do you expect to happen?
- What type of security leak does this point at?

SW Reasons for Service Attacks

- Missing input validation
 - Design errors
 - Boundary conditions
 - Exception handling
 - Access validation
-
- *Red = targets with increasing stats*
 - See also: OWASP Top 10

Vulnerability trends [Mitre]
(XSS = cross-site scripting)



Case Study: Common Security Negligences

- In 2014, Sony Pictures suffered major break-in
 - possibly by North Korea, in relation to movie *The Interview*
 - “mostly facilitated by unprecedented negligence”

- Problems included:
 - unencrypted storage of sensitive information
 - password stored in plain text files, sometimes even called “passwords” or placed in same directory as encrypted files
 - easily guessable passwords
 - large number of unmonitored devices
 - lack of accountability and responsibility for security, ignorance towards recommendations and audits
 - lack of systematic lesson-learning from previous failures (which included 2011 hacks of Sony PlayStation Network and Sony Pictures that stole account information including unsalted or plain text passwords)
 - weak IT and information security teams

- Stolen data included employee data (including financial data), internal emails, and movies

„salted“ ?

Afterthoughts: Security and Software Engineering

- Additional security related engineering principles, such as: [Neil Daswani]
 - least privilege
 - *No more rights for any app than absolutely necessary*
 - fail-safe stance
 - *Always return to safe, stable state, after any kind of deviation*
 - protecting against weakest link
 - *Rank vulnerability of components, pay particular attention to “champions”*
- 3 P security management:
Process,
People,
Probing your defences

mobile apps?

